Big challenges have always required people willing to build.
Generations before us invested in dams, highways, power systems and water infrastructure that served people they would never meet. Our generation faces its own challenge.
Every generation inherits infrastructure.
Every generation decides what it will leave behind.
Bold doesn't mean reckless. It means being willing to seriously test solutions proportional to the problem.
Put the Idea to the Test →A bold idea still has to survive the numbers.
We're testing the idea—not trying to prove a predetermined answer. Eight questions determine whether the concept deserves to move forward.
Can we identify enough durable Colorado River relief?
The current portfolio does not pretend the full 3 MAF has already been sourced. It starts with the base case the models test today.
See what 3 MAF could change over a decade.
This is a sensitivity model—not a forecast. It assumes the selected amount of net, legally creditable Colorado River relief is actually achieved each year, then compares storage change with and without that relief.
Can we power the water—and keep it flowing after sunset?
The concept combines firm nuclear generation, daytime solar, short-duration batteries and several days of product-water storage. Use the controls to see the role each piece plays.
Electricity has to be balanced every moment. Water doesn't.
When daytime energy is plentiful, desalination can run harder and fill product-water storage. At night, production can slow while stored water continues moving toward customers.
How would you create 3 MAF of Colorado River relief?
Different pathways can create the same river benefit—but they do not require the same infrastructure, energy or cost. Build a portfolio and watch the tradeoffs.
Scale the current Arizona assumptions six times.
This is useful for understanding magnitude—not for claiming what a real 3 MAF corridor would cost.
Illustrative linear-scale comparison only. It is not an engineered 3 MAF Arizona proposal. At that scale, route, pumping, environmental, construction and financing effects would not necessarily scale linearly.
Show the model assumptions
Illustrative expansion case: Mexico 0.75 MAF/year, California 1.00 MAF/year, Arizona direct 0.75 MAF/year — 2.50 MAF/year combined. The remaining 0.50 MAF/year needed to reach the strategic 3 MAF goal is intentionally left unresolved.
Program-cost assumptions: approximately $1,619/AF Mexico, $2,144/AF California and $2,425/AF Arizona direct. Energy assumptions are approximately 4.0, 3.0 and 5.5 MWh/AF respectively. These are planning-level model outputs, not bids or procurement estimates.
What could we improve—and what could we harm?
The current models identify environmental constraints but do not yet quantify them. This is a required feasibility test, not a footnote.
Marine intake, discharge and habitat impacts need site-specific study and mitigation.
Rights-of-way, habitat fragmentation and construction effects remain unengineered.
Potential environmental benefits must be evaluated alongside project impacts.
New nuclear generation requires a dedicated reclaimed-water or hybrid/dry-cooling strategy.
Engineering alone cannot create Colorado River relief.
New coastal water only helps the river if the accounting, contracts and agreements legally keep an equivalent amount of Colorado River water in the system.
What does it cost—and what should the Colorado River program actually pay for?
The economics model separates water infrastructure from revenue-producing power assets and recognizes local co-benefits rather than charging every dollar to basin recovery.
An illustrative two-unit new-nuclear case plus initial solar + storage is modeled as a separate revenue-producing power portfolio.
Water buys electricity. It does not automatically absorb generation CAPEX.Planning-level real-dollar estimates—not bids, procurement prices or final engineering costs.
Technically possible is not the same as actually buildable.
Neither current workbook is a construction schedule. The next step is to convert a concept into a staged program that can survive engineering, environmental review, agreements and financing.
Thinking big is the beginning.
Proving it is the responsibility.
The current work supports continued study—but it does not support declaring the concept solved.
Previous generations were willing to think big.
Our responsibility is to determine what is worth building next.
The evidence—not the ambition—must decide whether Save the Southwest deserves to become one of those projects.